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In this article, we investigate majority voting rules and majority voting
rules with quorums which take no social abstention decision and characterize
these voting rules in the framework of May(Econometrica 20:680-684,1952).
Standard voting schemes allow society, confronting two alternatives, to choose
abstention (namely social indifference between the two). However, in actual
politics, a resolute decision between the two has to be made. In this regard, we
define alternative majority voting rules which takes no abstention decision. -
we call them “pseudo majority voting rules”. Also, in actual politics, to obviate
the case where an alternative is elected with very poor support, quorums are
sometimes required of standard voting schemes. Regarding the problem of
social abstention and quorums, we define “majority voting rules with quorums
and status-quo bias” which which are similar to majority voting rules with
quorums by Houy(Theory and decision 67(3):295-301, 2009) but which are
biased in favor of the status-quo.
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1 Introduction
Standard voting schemes(such as majority voting by May(1952)) allow society,
confronting two alternatives, to choose abstention (namely social indifference
between the two). However, in actual politics especially in referenda where so-
ciety has to choose between the status-quo and an amendment, no abstention
is allowed; a resolute decision between the two has to be made. While indi-
viduals may abstain, society should not. There have been some attempts of
providing realistic meaning of social abstention. Some articles interpret social
abstention as the choice depending on anything else but the vote(agenda for
instance).1 Other articles interpret social abstention as postponement of the
decision. All these interpretations make it clear that an alternative in the end
has to be chosen; social abstention cannot be understood as being similar to
individual abstention. In this regard, the way we define, for example, majority
voting rule might not fully explain what is understood as the majority rule in
actual politics. We define alternative voting rules, which are similar to major-
ity voting rule but which takes no abstention decision. - we call them ”pseudo
majority voting rules”. One of our main results is the characterization of these
rules in the framework of May(1952).
To obviate the case where an alternative is elected with very poor support,
quorums are sometimes required of standard voting schemes. Houy(2007,2009)
provides two different ways to characterize majority voting rules with quorums
when there are only two alternatives. Houy(2007) introduced a family of voting
rules based on differences of votes with quorums and characterized such voting
rules; an alternative is chosen if the number of abstainers is less than a quorum
and the number of voters for the alternative is so large that the difference of
1Houy (2009)
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votes obtained by two alternatives is (strictly) greater than some constant.
The majority voting rules with quorums are special cases when the constant
equals zero. Since this family of voting rules does not generally satisfy Mono-
tonicity, he introduced Decisiveness cancellation. Houy(2009) also provides
the characterization of majority voting rules with quorums in the framework
of May(1952). Although these voting rules are widely implemented in the
cases of referenda, relatively little work has been done on social choice the-
ory. Moreover, considering the problem of social abstention discussed above,
his characterization and axioms are not satisfied anymore. Instead, we define
alternative majority voting rules with quorums which are similar to majority
voting rules with quorums but which are biased in favor of the status-quo -we
call them “majority voting rules with quorums and status-quo bias” and pro-
vide the characterization of these rules. When the required quorum is one, the
majority voting rule with the quorum and status-quo bias is identical to the
majority voting rule with status-quo bias which is a special case of pseudo ma-
jority voting rules and biased in favor of the status-quo. As a broad concept of
voting rules including pseudo majority voting rules and majority voting rules
with quorums and status-quo bias, we also define “pseudo majority voting
rules with quorums” which are similar to majority voting rules with quorums
and status-quo bias but which allow society to choose between two alternatives
arbitrarily when the numbers of votes for two alternatives are the same and
characterize these rules.
Since Neutrality which imposes equal treatments on alternatives is not sat-
isfied anymore under voting rules taking no abstention decision, we introduce
three weaker versions of neutrality. As a weaker version of Monotonicity, Weak
monotonicity which considers the number of abstainers is also introduced.
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Section 2 presents definitions of pseudo majority voting rules, majority
voting rules with quorums, and pseudo majority voting rules with quorums.
Section 3 states axioms used in the sequel and the characterizations of theo-
rems.
2 Formal framework
Let N = {1, . . . n} be the set of individuals in the society. Each individual
chooses between amendment(a) and status-quo(s). If for any individual i ∈
N Vi = 1(resp. Vi = −1), individual i votes for a(resp. s). If Vi = 0,
individual i abstains. Each individual can abstain while the society has to
choose between a and s. The vector of all individuals’ decisions is a voting
configuration, V = (V1, . . . Vn) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n = V. The voting configuration
−V is defined by −V = (−V1, . . . − Vn). Let σ be a permutation of N, A
voting configuration Vσ is defined by Vσ = (Vσ(1), . . . Vσ(n)). For V ∈ V,
we define N+(V ) = {i ∈ N |Vi = 1}, N−(V ) = {i ∈ N |Vi = −1}, and
N0(V ) = {i ∈ N |Vi = 0}. The cardinality of each set N+(V ), N−(V ), and
N0(V ) are n+(V ), n−(V ), and n0(V ) respectively.
A voting rule C is a mapping from V into {−1, 1} so that the society
can not abstain. C(V ) is the decision of the society when V is the voting
configuration.
In this article, we concentrate on voting rules where the society as a whole
is not allowed to abstain.
Definition. (Pseudo majority voting rule, Mp) The voting rule is a




1 if n+(V ) > n−(V ),
−1 if n+(V ) < n−(V ),
1 or − 1 if n+(V ) = n−(V ).
Mp states that a is socially chosen if the number of votes in favor of a(resp.
s) is strictly greater than the number of votes in favor of s(resp. a). If the
number of votes for a equals the number of votes for s, either a or s is chosen
by social conventional rules, agenda, etc. Mp is analogous to May’s(1952)
majority voting rule except that May’s majority voting rule allows the society
to abstain when a and s obtain the same number of votes. We note that Mp
can be changed depending on the social decision when two alternatives obtain
the same numbers of votes. We can generate a family of pseudo majority
voting rules by imposing a different social decision on each situation where two
alternatives obtain the same number of votes but the number of abstention is
varied. The following voting rule called “Majority voting rules with status-
quo bias, Msb,” is a special case of Mp in that the society chooses s when the
numbers of votes for a and s are the same.
Definition. (Majority voting rule with status-quo bias, Msb) The vot-
ing rule Msb is defined by ∀V ∈ V,
Msb(V ) =

1 if n+(V ) > n−(V ),
−1 otherwise.
Msb states that a is socially chosen if and only if the number of votes in
favor of a is strictly greater than the number of votes in favor of s. If the
number of votes for s is strictly greater than or equals the number of votes for
6
a, s is socially chosen.
Definition. (Majority voting rules with quorums and status-quo bias,
Mq) Let q ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The voting rule Mq is defined by ∀V ∈ V
Mq(V ) =

1 if n+(V ) + n−(V ) ≥ q and n+(V ) > n−(V ),
−1 otherwise.
If q ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the quorum, the majority voting rule with quorum q
and status-quo bias, Mq states that a is socially chosen if and only if (1) the
number of votes in favor of a is strictly greater than the number of votes in
favor of s and (2) the number of individuals abstaining is less than q. If either
the quorum is not achieved or the number of votes for a is less than or equals
the number of votes for s, s is socially chosen. The voting rule Msbis also
considered a family of Mq in that Mq is identical to Msb when the quorum is
1.
As comprehensive voting rules including all voting rules state above, we
can define pseudo majority voting rules with quorums.
Definition. (Pseudo majority voting rules with quorums, Mpq) Let
q ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The voting rule Mpq is defined by ∀V ∈ V
Mpq(V ) =

1 if n+(V ) + n−(V ) ≥ q and n+(V ) > n−(V )
1 or − 1 if n+(V ) + n−(V ) ≥ q and n+(V ) = n−(V )
−1 otherwise.
If q ∈ {0, . . . , n} is the quorum, the pseudo majority voting rules with
7
quorum q states that a is socially chosen if (1) the number of votes in favor
of a is (strictly) greater than that of s and (2) the number of individuals
abstaining is less than q. If either the quorum is not achieved or the number of
votes for a is less than that of s, s is socially chosen. Contrary to Msb, when
the numbers of votes for a and s are the same, a may be chosen as long as the
number of individuals abstaining is less than q. When the quorum is 0, Mpq
are considered as some special cases of Mp.
3 Axioms and result
We consider the following axioms to characterize the voting rules
Anonymity For any permutation σ of N , ∀V ∈ V, C(Vσ) = C(V ).
Anonymity is very usual since May(1952). C satisfies Anonymity if rela-
beling the names of individuals does not change the social choice.
Weak monotonicity. ∀V, V ′ ∈ V such that N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), N+(V ′) ⊇
N+(V ) and N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ), C(V ′) ≥ C(V ).
Weak monotonicity states that if a (sub)group consisting of voters for s and
abstainers changes its votes into a, the decision of society does not respond
to the change of the group’s votes in a “negative” way. On the other hand,
it also states that if a (sub)group of voters for a changes its votes into either
s or abstention, the decision of society does not respond in a “positive” way.
Weak monotonicity is a weaker axiom than usual Monotonicity,2 in the sense
that it depends on the change in the set of abstainers whereas Monotonicity
is satisfied regardless of the change in the set of abstainers.
2The Monotonicity axiom can be stated as follows.
∀V, V ′ ∈ V, N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ) and N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ), C(V ′) ≥ C(V ).
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Nondegeneracy. ∃V and V ′ ∈ V such that C(V ) = 1, C(V ′) = −1.
Nondegeneracy excludes trivial voting rules that choose only one alterna-
tives regardless of voting configurations.
Weak neutrality1. ∀V ∈ V such that n+(V ) 6= n−(V ) , C(−V ) = −C(V ).
Weak neutrality2. ∀V ∈ V, C(V ) = 1 implies C(−V ) = −C(V ) and ∀V ′ ∈
V such that n+(V ′) 6= n−(V ′) and N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), C(−V ′) = −C(V ′).
Weak neutrality3. ∀V ∈ V, C(V ) = 1 implies ∀V ′ ∈ V such that n+(V ′) 6=
n−(V ′) and N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), C(−V ′) = −C(V ′).
Weak neutrality1 states that if when the numbers of votes obtained by a and
s are different and every member of society reverses their voting between two
alternatives, so does the decision of society. Weak neutrality1 is weaker than
Neutrality since Weak neutrality1 considers only voting configurations which
have the different numbers of vote for a and s while Neutrality is satisfied
for all voting configurations.3 Weak neutrality2 states that if society chooses
a, then Neutrality is satisfied for this voting configuration and also when a
(sub)group of abstainers changes its votes and the numbers of votes for a
and s are different, the voting rule treats each alternative equally. Weak
neutrality3 is analog to Weak neutrality2 but does not impose Neutrality on
a voting configuration for which social decision is a, when the numbers of
votes for a and s are the same. When the numbers of votes for a and s
are different, Weak neutrality2 and Weak neutrality3 also state that once a
voting configuration satisfies Neutrality, Neutrality is satisfied as the group of
3The Neutrality axiom can be state as follows.
∀V ∈ V, C(−V ) = −C(V ).
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abstainers decreases. Weak neutrality1 implies Weak neutrality3 and Weak
neutrality2 implies Weak neutrality3, whereas the opposites are not true.
Strong pareto. ∀V ∈ V, C(V ) = 1 whenever N+(V ) 6= ∅ and N−(V ) = ∅
and C(V ) = −1 whenever N+(V ) = ∅ and N−(V ) 6= ∅.
Strong pareto states that if no individual votes for s(resp. a) and there is
at least one who votes for a(resp. s), then society respects the decisions of
individuals who cast valid votes, a(resp. s).
Theorem 1. The voting rule C satisfies Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, and
Weak neutrality1 if and only if C is a pseudo majority voting rule.
Proof. Checking that any pseudo majority voting rule C satisfies Anonymity
and Weak neutrality1 is straightforward.
We now show that C satisfies Weak monotonicity as well.
Suppose C(V ′) < C(V ) ,∃V ′, V ∈ V, such that N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ) and
N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ).
If C(V ′) = −1 when n+(V ′) < n−(V ′), C(V ) = −1 since n+(V ′) ≥ n+(V )
and n−(V ′) ≤ n−(V ). If C(V ) = 1 when n+(V ) > n−(V ), C(V ′) = 1 since
n+(V ′) ≥ n+(V ) and n−(V ′) ≤ n−(V ). Hence, the only possible case is
C(V ′) = −1 and C(V ) = 1 when n+(V ′) = n−(V ′) and n+(V ) = n−(V ),
which implies N+(V ) = N+(V ′) and N−(V ) = N−(V ′) since N+(V ) ⊆
N+(V ′) and N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ). For V ′ = V, C(V ′) = C(V ), since C is a
mapping from V into {−1, 1}. It is not possible to make a decision rule which
generates different social decisions for the identical voting configuration. Thus,
it is contradiction.
For the proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 1, assume that the voting
ruleC satisfies Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, and Weak neutrality1.
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Since C satisfies Anonymity, C depends only on n+(V ), n0(V ), and n−(V ).
We can define C(V ) = c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )).
With Anonymity, Weak monotonicity can be represented as follows;
The anonymous voting rule c satisfies Weak Monotonicity if and only if
∀V, V ′ ∈ V, such that n0(V ′) ≤ n0(V ), n+(V ′) ≥ n+(V ) and n−(V ′) ≤
n−(V ), c(n−(V ′), n0(V ′), n+(V ′)) ≥ c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )).
Suppose n+(V ) < n−(V ) and c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) = 1. Note that
n+(V ) = n−(−V ), and n−(V ) = n+(−V ).
By Weak neutrality1,
c(n−(−V ), n0(−V ), n+(−V )) = −1 = −c(n+(V ), n0(V ), n−(V )) and
n+(V ) + n−(V ) = n+(−V ) + n−(−V )
n−(−V ) = n+(V ) < n−(V ) and n+(−V ) = n−(V ) > n+(V ).
Therefore, by Weak monotonicity,
1 = c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V ))) ≤c(n−(−V ), n0(−V ), n+(−V )) = −1 which is
contradiction.
Hence, c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) = −1 when n+(V ) < n−(V ). Also, when
n+(V ) > n−(V ), c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) = 1 by Weak neutrality1.
The following proposition shows that the characterization of Mp is minimal
in the sense that all the axioms used for Theorem 1 are independent.
Proposition 2. Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, and Weak neutrality1 are
independent.
Proof. Weak monotonicity, Weak neutrality1 9Anonymity.




Vi if Vi 6= 0
1 if Vi = 0 and n
+(V ) > n−(V )
−1 if Vi = 0 and n+(V ) ≤ n−(V ).
Obviously, C−A satisfies Weak neutrality1 while C−A violates Anonymity.
We now show that C−Asatisfies Weak monotonicity. Suppose that ∀V, V ′ ∈
V, such that N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ) ,and N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ),
1 = C−A(V ) > C−A(V
′) = −1. Let V ′i and Viare individual i’s voting when
the voting configuration are V ’ and V respectively. From the definition of C−A,
V has either Vi = 1or Vi = 0 when n
+(V ) > n−(V ) while V ′ has either V ′i =
−1 or V ′i = 0 when n+(V ) ≤ n−(V ). If V ′i = −1, since Vi ∈ N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ),
Vi = −1 which contradicts to the assumption that C−A(V ) = 1. If V ′i = 0 and
n+(V ′) ≤ n−(V ′), since V ′i ∈ N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), Vi = 0 and n+(V ) > n−(V )
which contradicts to the assumption that N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ), and N−(V ′) ⊆
N−(V ). Hence, C−A(V ) < C−A(V
′).
Anonymity, Weak neutrality19 Weak monotonicity.
Let us defined the voting rule C−WM by ∀V ∈ V,
C−WM (V ) =

1 if n+(V ) < n−(V ),
−1 if n+(V ) > n−(V ),
1 or − 1 if n+(V ) = n−(V ).
which is a family of anti-pseudo majority voting rules. Obviously, C−WM
satisfies Anonymity and Weak neutrality 1 while C−WM violates Weak mono-
tonicity.
Anonymity, Weak monotonicity 9 Weak neutrality1.
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Let us define the voting rule C−WN1 by ∀V ∈ V,
C−WN1(V ) =

1 if qn+(V ) > n−(V )
−1 otherwise.
where 0 < q < 1. It is straightforward to check that C−WN1 satisfies
Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, but C−WN1does not satisfies Weak neutral-
ity1.
We can provide the characterization of the majority voting rules with quo-
rums and status-quo bias by replacing Weak neutrality1 with Weak neutral-
ity2 and adding Nondegeneracy. The majority voting rules with quorums and
status-quo bias is analog to the Houy’s(2009) majority voting rules with quo-
rums except that the society is in favor of status-quo when the numbers of
votes for two alternatives are the same.
Theorem 3. The voting rule C satisfies Anonymity, Weak monotonicity,
Nondegeneracy, and Weak neutrality2 if and only if C is the majority voting
rule with quorum and status-quo bias.
To prove Theorem 3, we need the following lemma in the sequel.
Lemma 4. If any voting rule C satisfies Weak monotonicity, Nondegeneracy,
and Weak neutrality2, then C satisfies Weak Pareto.4
Proof. Suppose C(V ) = −1 when N+(V ) = N . By Weak monotonicity
C(V ) = −1 ∀V ∈ V which contradicts to Nondegeneracy. Hence C(V ) = 1.
By Weak neutrality2, C(−V ) = −C(V ) = −1when N−(−V ) = N . Thus,
C(V ) = −1 when N−(V ) = N.
4In this framework, C satisfies Weak Pareto if C(V ) = 1 when N+(V ) = N and C(V ) =
−1 when N−(V ) = N .
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Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Checking that any C satisfies Anonymity, Nondegeneracy, and Weak
neutrality2 is straightforward.
We now show that C satisfies Weak monotonicity as well.
Suppose that ∃V ′, V ∈ V, such that N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ), N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ),
and N(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ) C(V ′) < C(V ).
C(V ) = 1 only when n+(V ) + n−(V ) ≥ q and n+(V ) > n−(V ). Since
N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ) and N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ), n+(V ′) ≥ n+(V ) > n−(V ) ≥
n−(V ′). Hence, C(V ′) = 1 which contradicts the assumption that C(V ′) <
C(V ). Thus, C(V ′) > C(V ) ∀V ′, V ∈ V, such that N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ) ,
N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ), and N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ).
For the proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 3, assume that C satisfies
Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, Nondegeneracy, and Weak neutrality2.
Since C satisfies Anonymity, C(V ) depends only on n+(V ), n0(V ), and
n−(V ). Let C(V ) = c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) ∀V ∈ V.
As we can see in Theorem 1, with Anonymity, Weak monotonicity can be
represented as follows;
The anonymous voting rule c satisfies Weak Monotonicity if and only if
∀V, V ′ ∈ V, such that n0(V ′) ≤ n0(V ), n+(V ′) ≥ n+(V ) and n−(V ′) ≤
n−(V ), c(n−(V ′), n0(V ′), n+(V ′)) ≥ c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )).
With Anonymity, Weak neutrality2 can be represented as follows;
The anonymous voting rule C satisfies Weak neutrality2 if and only if ∀V ∈ V,
c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) = 1 implies c(n−(−V ), n0(−V ), n+(−V )) =−c(n−(V )
, n0(V ), n+(V )) and ∀V ′ ∈ V such that n+(V ′) 6= n−(V ′) and n0(V ′) ≤ n0(V ),
c(n−(−V ′),n0(−V ′), n+(−V ′))= −c(n−(V ′), n0(V ′), n+(V ′)).
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Suppose that c(0, n0(V ), 0) = 1. By Weak neutrality2, c(0, n0(−V ), 0) =
−c(0, n0(V ), 0) = −1 which is contradiction because n0(V ) = n0(−V ) and
c(0, n0(−V ), 0) = c(0, n0(V ), 0) = 1 by Anonymity. Also, as the same way, we
can prove that ∀V ∈ V such that n−(V ) = n+(V ), c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) =
−1. That is, when the numbers of vote for two alternatives are the same, the
decision of society is -1(maintaining the status quo).
By the assumption and lemma 4, we know that C satisfies Weak pareto.
Since c(0, n, 0) = −1 and c(0, 0, n) = 1, there exists p ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that
c(0, 0, n) ≥ c(0, 1, n− 1) ≥ . . . ≥ c(0, p− 1, n− p+ 1) = 1
> c(0, p, n− p) ≥ c(0, p+ 1, n− p− 1) ≥ . . . ≥ c(0, n, 0) = −1
(3.1)
Because of the second row of (3.1), C(V ) = −1 ∀V ∈ V such that p ≤
n0(V ) by Weak monotonicity.
Because of the first row of (3.1), c(n, 0, 0) = c(n − 1, 1, 0) = . . . c(n − p +
1, p− 1, 0) = −1 by Weak neutrality2.
Finally, we prove by contradiction that C(V ) = 1 ∀V ∈ V such that
p− 1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) > n−(V ).
Suppose there exists C(V c) = −1 such that p− 1 ≥ n0(V c) and n+(V c) >
n−(V c). Since c(0, p − 1, n − p + 1) = 1 and p − 1 ≥ n0(V c), 1 = −C(V c) =
C(−V c) by Weak neutrality 2. Note that n+(V c) = n−(−V c), and n−(V c) =
n+(−V c). By Weak monotonicity,
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n+(V c) + n−(V c) = n+(−V c) + n−(−V c)
n+(V c) > n−(V c) = n+(−V c)and n−(V c) < n+(V c) = n−(−V c)
∴ C(V c) ≥ C(−V c)
which contradicts to the assumption that C(V c) = −1and C(−V c) = 1.
Hence, C(V ) = 1 ∀V ∈ V such that p−1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) > n−(V ). Since
C(V ′) = 1 ∀V ′ ∈ V such that p − 1 ≥ n0(V ′) and n+(V ′) > n−(V ′),∀V ∈
V such that p − 1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) < n−(V ), C(V ) = −1 by Weak
neutrality2.
Msb is a family of Mq in the sense that Msb is the majority voting rule
with the quorum 1. Lemma 4 states that any voting rules satisfying Weak
monotonicity, Nondegeneracy, and Weak neutrality2, also satisfy Weak pareto.
We can characterize Msb by imposing stronger axiom, Strong pareto, instead
of Weak pareto on Mq and eliminating a redundant axiom, Nondegeneracy
which Strong pareto implies.
Corollary 5. The voting rule C satisfies Anonymity, Weak monotonicity,
Weak neutrality2 and Strong pareto if and only if C is the majority voting
rule with status-quo bias.
Proof. Checking that any C satisfies Anonymity, Weak neutrality2 and Strong
pareto is straightforward.
We now show that C satisfies Weak monotonicity as well.
Suppose that ∃V ′, V ∈ V, such that N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ), N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ),
and N(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), C(V ′) < C(V ).
C(V ) = 1 only when n+(V ) > n−(V ). Since N+(V ′) ⊇ N+(V ) and
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N−(V ′) ⊆ N−(V ), n+(V ′) ≥ n+(V ) > n−(V ) ≥ n−(V ′). Hence, C(V ′) = 1
which contradicts the assumption that C(V ′) < C(V ).
For the proof of the sufficiency part of Corollary 5, assume that C satisfies
Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, Weak neutrality2 and Strong pareto.
As in Theorem 3, by Weak neutrality2 we know that ∀V ∈ V such that
n+(V ) = n−(V ), C(V ) = −1. Also, ∀V ∈ V, C(V ) = 1 whenever n+(V ) > 0
and n−(V ) = 0 by Strong pareto. We prove by contradiction that C(V ) = 1
∀V ∈ V such that n− 1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) > n−(V ).
Suppose there exists C(V c) = −1 such that n− 1 ≥ n0(V c) and n+(V c) >
n−(V c). Since c(0, n−1, 1) = 1 and n−1 ≥ n0(V c), 1 = −C(V c) = C(−V c) by
Weak neutrality 2. Note that n+(V c) = n−(−V c), and n−(V c) = n+(−V c).
By Weak monotonicity,
n+(V c) + n−(V c) = n+(−V c) + n−(−V c)
n+(V c) > n+(−V c)and n−(V c) < n−(−V c)
∴ C(V c) ≥ C(−V c)
which contradicts to the assumption that C(V c) = −1and C(−V c) = 1.
Hence, C(V ) = 1 ∀V ∈ V such that n − 1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) > n−(V ).
Since C(V ) = 1 ∀V ∈ V such that n− 1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) > n−(V ′),∀V ∈
V such that n − 1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) < n−(V ), C(V ) = −1 by Weak
neutrality2.
Since the majority voting rules with quorums and status-quo bias is a
family of pseudo majority voting rules with quorums, we can characterize
pseudo majority voting rules with quorums by imposing a weaker axiom, Weak
neutrality3, instead of Weak neutrality2. Contrary to Mq, Mp do not require
social decision to choose s(maintaining the status quo) when all individuals
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abstain. If Mpq allow society to choose a when all individuals abstain, these
voting rules can be considered as some cases of the pseudo majority voting
rules with quorum 0.
Theorem 6. The voting rule C satisfies Anonymity, Weak monotonicity,
Nondegeneracy, and Weak neutrality3 if and only if C is a pseudo majority
voting rule with quorum or a pseudo majority voting rule with C(V ) = 1 when
N0(V ) = N .
Proof. Checking that any C satisfies Anonymity, Nondegeneracy, and Weak
neutrality3 is straightforward. Also as in Theorem 3, any C satisfies Weak
monotonicity.
For the proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 6, assume that C satisfies
Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, Nondegeneracy, and Weak neutrality3.
Since C satisfies Anonymity, C(V ) depends only on n+(V ), n0(V ), and
n−(V ). Let C(V ) = c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) ∀V ∈ V.
With Anonymity, Weak neutrality3 can be represented as follows;
The anonymous voting rule C satisfies Weak neutrality3 if and only if ∀V ∈ V,
c(n−(V ), n0(V ), n+(V )) = 1 implies ∀V ′ ∈ V such that n+(V ′) 6= n−(V ′) and
n0(V ′) ≤ n0(V ), c(n−(−V ′), n0(−V ′), n+(−V ′)) = −c(n−(V ′), n0(V ′), n+(V ′)).
Suppose C(V ) = −1 when N+(V ) = N . By Weak monotonicity C(V ) =
−1 ∀V ∈ V which contradicts to Nondegeneracy. Hence C(V ) = 1.
By Weak neutrality2, C(−V ) = −C(V ) = −1when N−(−V ) = N . Thus,
C(V ) = −1 when N−(V ) = N.
If c(0, n, 0) = −1, since c(0, 0, n) = 1, there exists p ∈ {1, . . . . . . , n} such
that
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c(0, 0, n) ≥ c(0, 1, n− 1) ≥ . . . ≥ c(0, p− 1, n− p+ 1) = 1
> c(0, p, n− p) ≥ c(0, p+ 1, n− p− 1) ≥ . . . ≥ c(0, n, 0) = −1
(3.2)
Since the second row of (3.2), C(V ) = −1 ∀V ∈ V such that p ≤ n0(V ) by
Weak monotonicity.
Because of the first row of (3.2), c(n, 0, 0) = c(n − 1, 1, 0) = . . . c(n − p +
1, p− 1, 0) = −1 by Weak neutrality3.
We prove by contradiction that C(V ) = 1 ∀V ∈ V such that p−1 ≥ n0(V )
and n+(V ) > n−(V ).
Suppose there exists C(V c) = −1 such that p− 1 ≥ n0(V c) and n+(V c) >
n−(V c). Since c(0, p − 1, n − p + 1) = 1 and p − 1 ≥ n0(V c), 1 = −C(V c) =
C(−V c) by Weak neutrality 2. Note that n+(V c) = n−(−V c), and n−(V c) =
n+(−V c). By Weak monotonicity,
n+(V c) + n−(V c) = n+(−V c) + n−(−V c)
n+(V c) > n−(V c) = n+(−V c)and n−(V c) < n+(V c) = n−(−V c)
∴ C(V c) ≥ C(−V c)
which contradicts to the assumption that C(V c) = −1and C(−V c) = 1.
Hence, C(V ) = 1 ∀V ∈ V such that p−1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) > n−(V ). Since
C(V ′) = 1 ∀V ′ ∈ V such that p − 1 ≥ n0(V ′) and n+(V ′) > n−(V ′),∀V ∈
V such that p − 1 ≥ n0(V ) and n+(V ) < n−(V ), C(V ) = −1 by Weak
neutrality3.
If c(0, n, 0) = 1, since c(0, 0, n) = 1,∀V ∈ V such that n−(V ) = 0, C(V ) = 1
by Weak monotonicity.
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We prove by contradiction that C(V ) = 1 ∀V ∈ V such that n+(V ) >
n−(V ).
Suppose there exists C(V ) = −1, ∀V ∈ V such that n+(V ) > n−(V ). Since
c(0, n, 0) = 1, C(−V ) = 1 by Weak neutrality3. Note that n+(V ) = n−(−V ),
and n−(V ) = n+(−V ). By Weak monotonicity,
n+(V ) + n−(V ) = n+(−V ) + n−(−V )
n+(V ) > n−(V ) = n+(−V )and n−(V ) < n+(V ) = n−(−V )
∴ C(V ) ≥ C(−V )
which contradicts to the assumption that C(V ) = −1and C(−V ) = 1.
Hence, C(V ) = 1 when n+(V ) > n−(V ) and by Weak neutrality3, C(V ) =
−1,when n+(V ) < n−(V )
The following proposition presents that the characterization of Mqis min-
imal in the sense that all the axioms used for Theorem 6 are independent.
Also, since Strong pareto implies Nondegeneracy and Weak neutrality2 implies
Weak neutrality3, all the group of axioms used for Theorem3, Cororally5, and
Theorem6 are independent.
Proposition 7. Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, Nondegeneracy, and Weak
neutrality3 are independent.
Proof. Weak monotonicity, Nondegeneracy, Weak neutrality2 9Anonymity.




Vi if Vi 6= 0
1 if Vi = 0 and n
+(V ) > n−(V )
−1 if Vi = 0 and n+(V ) ≤ n−(V ).
Obviously, C−A satisfies Nondegeneracy, while C−A violates Anonymity.
C−A also satisfies Weak monotonicity as we showed in proposition 2.
We now show that C−Asatisfies Weak Neutrality2. When Vi = 1, ∀V ′ ∈ V
such that N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), -1=C(−V ′) = −Vi = −C(V ′). When Vi = 0
and n+(V ) > n−(V ), ∀V ′ ∈ V such that V ′i = 0 and N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ),
C(−V ′) = −C(V ′) since n+(−V ′) < n−(−V ′) when n+(V ′) > n−(V ′) and
n+(−V ′) > n(−V ′) when n+(V ′) < n(V ′). When Vi = 0 and n+(V ) > n−(V ),
∀V ′ ∈ V such that V ′i 6= 0 and N0(V ′) ⊆ N0(V ), C(−V ′) = −V ′i = −C(V ′).
Anonymity, Nondegeneracy, Weak neutrality2 9Weak monotonicity.
Let q ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Let us define the voting rule C ′−WM by ∀V ∈ V,
C ′−WM (V ) =

1 if n+(V ) + n−(V ) ≥ q and n+(V ) < n−(V ),
−1 otherwise.
It is straightforward to check that C ′−WM satisfies Anonymity, Nondegen-
eracy, and Weak neutrality 2, but C ′−WM does not satisfy Weak monotonicity.
Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, Weak neutrality2 9Nondegeneracy.
Let us define the voting rule C−ND by ∀V ∈ V, C−ND(V ) = −1.
C−ND satisfies Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, Weak neutrality2 but does
not satisfies Nondegeneracy.
Anonymity, Weak monotonicity, Nondegeneracy 9Weak neutrality2 .
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Let us define the voting rule C−WN2 by ∀V ∈ V,
C−WN2(V ) =

1 if qn+(V ) > n−(V )
−1 otherwise.
where 0 < q < 1. It is straightforward to check that C−WN2 satisfies
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국문초록





두 대안이 존재할 시 일반적인 투표이론의 경우 사회가 기권하는 것
을 용인하며 이 사회적 기권은 사회가 무차별하다는 의미로 해석된다. 그러나 
현실 정치에서는 하나의 대안만이 사회적으로 선택되어야 한다는 점에서 사회
적 기권은 존재할 수 없다. 또한 현실 정치에서 저조한 투표율로 인해 낮은 
지지(支持)에도 하나의 대안이 선택되는 것을 방지하고자 국민투표와 같은 경
우 정족수를 요구하는데 이러한 정족수가 요구되는 투표에 대한 규범적인 특
성에 관한 연구는 Houy(2007,2009)의 논문을 제외하고 거의 논의가 되지 않은 
실정이다.
본 논문은 두 위의 두 가지 관점에 기초하여 사회가 기권하지 못하는 
경우를 고려한 의사 다수결 투표(pseudo majority voting rules)와 정족수가 
요구되는 경우 현상유지 선호적 다수결 투표(Majority voting rules with
quorums and status-quo bias)를 위주로 이를 포괄하는 다양한 투표를 규정하
고 이에 대한 규범적인 특성화 작업을 하는데 있다.
주요어 : 다수결투표, 사회선택이론, 정족수, 현상유지편향, 기권
학  번 : 2011-23173
